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Abstract—In proof-of-work based blockchains such as
Ethereum, verification of blocks is an integral part of establishing
consensus across nodes. However, in Ethereum, miners do not
receive a reward for verifying. This implies that miners face the
Verifier’s Dilemma: use resources for verification, or use them for
the more lucrative mining of new blocks? We provide an extensive
analysis of the Verifier’s Dilemma, using a data-driven model-
based approach that combines closed-form expressions, machine
learning techniques and discrete-event simulation. We collect
data from over 300,000 smart contracts and experimentally
obtain their CPU execution times. Gaussian Mixture Models and
Random Forest Regression transform the data into distributions
and inputs suitable for the simulator. We show that, indeed,
it is often economically rational not to verify. We consider two
approaches to mitigate the implications of the Verifier’s Dilemma,
namely parallelization and active insertion of invalid blocks, both
will be shown to be effective.
Index Terms—Ethereum, Smart Contract, Benchmark, Perfor-
mance, Simulation, Verifier’s Dilemma
I. INTRODUCTION
Blockchains depend on miners to operate the chain correctly
and to jointly guarantee consistency and correctness of the
blockchain data and the executed transactions. In public,
permissionless, blockchains collaboration of miners is based
on incentive mechanisms that provide miners with a certain
amount of cryptocurrency for their efforts. It is clearly impor-
tant to award fees in such a manner that correct and desired
behaviour is encouraged. Well-balanced incentives, together
with the miner’s interest to keep the system running well,
should guarantee the correct behaviour of the blockchain.
Within Ethereum, there is one interesting aspect of the
consensus algorithm that is not incentivised directly, namely
the verification of transactions and blocks. This leads to an
interesting dilemma: should miners verify transactions within
blocks if they do not receive a specific fee for it? If all blocks
are valid, the verification would not have been necessary and
the time spent on verifying could have been used to mine new
blocks (which are rewarded by a fee). This Verifier’s Dilemma
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is well recognized, e.g., [1], [2], but has not been system-
atically analysed. In this paper we conduct that systematic
analysis of the Verifier’s Dilemma in Ethereum.
The analysis is involved, and combines a number of analysis
techniques to establish the fees miners would collect under
different decisions about participation in the verification. We
pursue a model-based approach, so that we are able to analyse
a range of possible scenarios. It is not practical or even
possible to obtain insights about the Verifier’s Dilemma solely
based on observations of the actual Ethereum system. A
model-based approach, correctly intertwined with data-driven
parameterization, is the only reasonable approach.
We combine the following techniques. At the core of
the analysis is the publicly available Ethereum simulator
BlockSim. This simulator is general purpose and extensible
by design [3]. We extended it with functionality necessary
for the analysis of the Verifier’s Dilemma under various
scenarios. Secondly, to run realistic simulation studies, we
conduct an extensive data collection exercise for Ethereum
smart contracts. This data aims to feed into the simulator
realistic system parameters and realistic characteristics of
smart contract based transactions. The data collection includes
324 thousand Ethereum smart contracts. Thirdly, we applied
statistic/machine-learning techniques to the data to make it
suitable as input to the simulator. In particular, we use Gaus-
sian Mixture Models to fit distributions to the data, for instance
the distribution of Used Gas per smart contract (for Used
Gas, see Section II). And we use Random Forest Regression
to predict the CPU time needed to execute smart contracts,
given the Used Gas. The resulting distributions are used to
parameterize the simulations. As a fourth and final element in
our study, we obtain a number of closed-form results for base
scenarios. In these base scenarios no invalid blocks are present,
and under that assumption we are able to derive expressions
for the rewards miners receive if they do or do not verify
blocks.
The conclusion of the above analysis is that under certain
conditions it pays off for miners not to verify. Obviously, not
verifying blocks put the correct functioning of the blockchain
at risk, since the consensus approach in Ethereum assumes
verification to take place. To mitigate this risk, we consider
two approaches. First, we consider parallel verification (as
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proposed in [4]), to decrease the time it takes to verify blocks
and therefore decrease the time verifying miners would have
to spend before they can mine a new block. Secondly, we will
consider the idea of injecting invalid blocks on purpose, to
penalize miners that do not verify. The reasoning behind that
approach was identified in [2]. By injecting invalid blocks, a
non-verifying miner would more often pass on chains with
invalid blocks that will be rejected by other miners, which in
turn would imply that the non-verifying miner does not receive
the block award.
To summarize, the results of our analysis are as follows.
It is clear that there are many scenarios in which miners
would benefit from not verifying blocks. This is especially
true if (1) all or almost all blocks are in fact valid, and (2) if
the block limit is large enough. For Ethereum, currently the
impact is small but the Verifier’s Dilemma will become more
important when the block limit increases, as is anticipated
[1]. As mitigation approaches, both parallel verification and
injecting invalid blocks improve the situation. That is, both
make it less lucrative for miners to avoid verifying.
This paper is structured as follows. Section II and Section
III introduce the problem space, providing background and an
explanation of the Verifier’s Dilemma. Section III-B provides
the closed-form expressions for the gain in rewards non-
verifying members could get for the base model, i.e., the case
that all transactions are valid. Section IV introduces the two
mitigation approaches, namely parallelization and injecting
invalid transactions. The data collection exercise for over
300,000 smart contracts in Ethereum is discussed in Section V.
Section V-B also discusses the machine learning approaches of
Gaussian Mixture Models and Random Forest Regression used
to establish distributions that serve as input for the simulator.
We note that more detailed results derived with the machine
learning techniques can be found in Appendix XI. Section VI
describes how we used the publicly available simulator and
enhanced it to suit our study. The results of the simulation
study are provided in Section VII, for various scenarios as
well as for the two mitigation strategies and the insights gained
and conclusions drawn are further discussed in Section VIII.
Finally, related work is discussed in Section IX and Section
X provides the conclusion.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Ethereum Blockchain
A blockchain is a distributed ledger of linked blocks,
where each block contains a number of transactions. In the
blockchain network, a set of nodes, known as miners, are
responsible for maintaining the ledger by continuously ap-
pending new blocks. To generate and append a new block
to the blockchain, miners first select and execute a number
of pending transactions from the network and then include
them in the block by executing a mechanism such as Proof of
Work (PoW). The generated block will then be propagated
to other nodes in the network. Upon receiving the newly
generated block, every node is expected to verify the block
before adding it to its blockchain’s copy. Verifying a block
requires checking the correctness of the block construction
(e.g., PoW verification) and executing all transactions included
in the block to check the outcome. This is to verify and validate
miners’ work, and is called the verification process.
The first generation of blockchain systems (e.g., Bitcoin
[5]) provided predominantly cryptocurrencies in support of fi-
nancial interactions. Blockchain-based smart contract systems
(e.g., Ethereum [6], [7]) emerged to support more complex
distributed applications through smart contracts. A smart con-
tract is essentially a computer program that can be attached
to the blockchain. It contains contractual clauses and it is
enforced by the consensus algorithm. Currently, Ethereum
is the most popular smart contract platform [8], offering a
Turing-complete programming language for writing contracts.
In Ethereum, there are two types of accounts (users),
namely, externally owned accounts and contract accounts.
Contract accounts contain smart contract code and some
storage space to support the execution of smart contracts.
Accounts interact with each other through transactions. In
Ethereum, there are two types of transactions, namely, transfer
and contract transactions. The former is to move Ether (the
Ethereum cryptocurrency) between accounts, while the latter
is to either publish a new smart contract to the blockchain or
to invoke an existing one.
To publish a new contract, a contract-creation transaction
containing the creation bytecode for the contract is sub-
mitted to the blockchain. Once the transaction is executed,
the contract will be deployed and a unique address will be
assigned to it. To invoke that contract, a contract-execution
transaction attaching appropriate input data is sent to the
contract’s address. The input data is the contract’s function
to be executed and its arguments.
All nodes in the Ethereum blockchain run the Ethereum
Virtual Machine (EVM). The EVM is responsible for execut-
ing contract transactions [7]. It executes the smart contract
instructions, known as opcodes. Transactions are currently
executed and verified on the EVM sequentially.
B. Ethereum Incentive Model
Ethereum has a built-in incentive model to reward miners
for maintaining and expanding the blockchain ledger. There
are three types of rewards, namely, block reward, block’s
transactions fees and uncle rewards. The block reward is a
fixed amount of Ether (currently, 2 Ether) for each new block.
The block’s transactions fees are the fees associated with all
transactions included in the block. The uncle rewards are a
fraction of rewards for generating and including a new block
that turns into a stale (orphan) block [7].
Ethereum uses the Gas mechanism to calculate the fee for
smart contract transactions. Each opcode of a smart contract
uses a predefined amount of gas, as specified in [7]. The EVM
tallies the amount of Used Gas and charges the submitter of the
transaction based on the Used Gas. To avoid non-terminating
transactions the submitter specifies a Gas Limit, and the EVM
stops processing if that limit is reached (in which case Used
Gas = Gas Limit). The submitter also specifies a Gas Price
(expressed in Ether) and the miner then charges the submitter
the following transaction fee: Used Gas × Gas Price. The
more opcodes the transaction requires, the more CPU effort
from the miner, but also the higher the received reward.
It is crucial to ensure that the Ethereum incentive model is
fair in order to keep miners well-motivated to participate and
to maintain the blockchain ledger honestly [9] [10]. Otherwise,
miners may prefer to deviate from the desired behaviour. One
issue of Ethereum and some other blockchains is that there
are no miner incentives for verifying the recipient blocks. As
a result, miners might be encouraged to avoid the verification
process, especially if it tends to be computationally intensive,
in favour of maximizing their revenues, as we will discuss in
the following section.
III. VERIFIER’S DILEMMA IN ETHEREUM
We first present and discuss in Section III-A the Verifier’s
Dilemma in general terms and then we derive in Section
III-B closed-form expression for the rewards received by
non-verifying miners. These closed-form expressions hold for
scenarios in which all blocks are valid, which we will call the
base model.
A. Problem Description
Luu et al. [1] pointed out that verification of blocks
consumes computation resources and time, and thus, delays
miners in the race of mining the next block. Not only it
delays miners, but also it does not provide incentives (a free
task) to miners. This is especially true in smart contract based
blockchains since verification of smart contracts involves
repeating the execution of the smart contract to check the
outputs. [1] also points out that these concerns exacerbate
when the block limit increases since that increases the number
of transactions to verify.
As a result, miners might consider skipping the verification
process. Skipping verification allows the miners to turn to
the profitable mining of new blocks. The risk of skipping
verification is that the miner adds its newly mined blocks
to a blockchain that contains invalid blocks. If other miners
verify these blocks they will disregard these and the new block
and the non-verifying miner will not receive a reward for its
new block. The miner needs to decide the following: should I
support the blockchain honestly and verify all blocks, possibly
at the cost of personal rewards, or shall I skip verifying blocks
and instead spent the time on the lucrative mining of new
blocks, thus increasing personal rewards? [1] calls this the
Verifier’s Dilemma.
The Verifier’s Dilemma has received some attention, we
refer to the discussion on related work in Section IX. However,
there has not been a rigorous analysis of the dilemma using
probabilistic modelling techniques such as in this paper.
B. Ethereum Base Model
In Ethereum, miners are expected to verify received blocks
by executing the block’s transactions in sequence. In this sec-
tion, we use closed-form solutions to investigate the Verifier’s
Dilemma in Ethereum and its impact on the fee received by
miners. We consider current and likely future configurations
of Ethereum in terms of block limit and block interval time.
There are a few model assumptions that will hold through-
out the paper. We assume that miners fill each block by exe-
cuting as many transactions as they can in order to maximise
their revenue. In the real system, miners can generate full,
non-full, or even empty blocks, but this is not critical for
the analysis of the Verifier’s Dilemma. If needed this can
be added to the model. All transactions in the network are
assumed to be contract-based transactions, thus ignoring the
additional financial transactions that may take place. Such
financial transactions take less time to verify and therefore
do not impact the Verifier’s Dilemma as much, but these can
of course easily be added. We also ignore the time it takes
to check the hash outcome of the PoW, since that check is
almost immediate. Finally, we do not explicitly consider block
propagation delay between nodes since this does not affect the
issue of the Verifiier’s Dilemma,
We will now derive closed form results for scenarios in
which all miners are honest when executing transactions. That
is, all transactions included in a block are valid. Assume that
all miners use the same hardware/software architectures, and
thus, the CPU time required to execute transactions is the
same for all miners. The verification time T v is the CPU time
required to execute and verify all transactions embedded in a
block. It is worth noting that a miner only verifies blocks that
are generated by other miners, not the ones it generates itself.
Thus, the average block’s verification time decreases with the
increase of the miner’s hash power α, since then there are
less blocks generated by others. For instance, a miner with α
= 0.30 of total network hash power is expected to verify 70%
of the total generated blocks, which means that it spends on
average (1− α) ∗ T v for verification per block.
We propose the following closed-form solutions to estimate
the fraction of fee received by both verifying and non-verifying
miners as a function of block limit, block interval time and
fraction of hash power. We estimate the slow down δ of
performing the sequential verification process by considering
the average time required to verify the received blocks T v
and the sum of the hash powers of all verifying miners αV
as follows.
δ = (1− αV ) ∗ T v (1)
Where 1− αV represents the fraction of hash power of non-
verifying miners. The probability of finding the next block by
a verifying miner is then reduced from αvT b to
αv
T b+δ
, where
T b is the block interval time. That means the fraction of the
expected blocks and rewards (Rv) for a verifying miner is
reduced from αv to
Rv =
αv
T b + δ
∗ T b (2)
The fraction of the expected blocks and rewards (Rs) for a
non-verifying miner is increased from αs to
Rs = αs+
αs(αV −RV )
αS
(3)
Where αS is the sum of the hash powers of all non-verifying
miners, and RV is the fraction of blocks and rewards gained
by all verifying miners.
Results from this closed-form solution will be discussed
in Section VII, but to illustrate the implications, assume 10
miners, each controlling α = 0.1 of the total network hash
power. Assume there is only one miner among those miners
who does not verify. Assume T v = 3.18 and T b = 12 seconds.
We calculate the slow down of performing the verification
as δ = 0.318. The fraction of blocks generated by the nine
verifying miners is reduced from 0.9 to 0.878. Thus, the non-
verifying miner would gain 0.022 more blocks and rewards (≈
22% more than its invested α). In other words, the fraction of
reward obtained by the non-verifying miner is increased from
0.1 to 0.122.
IV. MITIGATION SOLUTIONS TO THE VERIFIER’S
DILEMMA
We discuss two mitigation solutions for the Verifier’s
Dilemma, namely parallel verification of transactions and
intentional production of invalid blocks.
A. Mitigation 1: Parallel Verification
Parallel verification was proposed by [4] to speed up the
verification process, thereby minimizing the lost time to min-
ers. By speeding up the time it takes to verify transactions,
a miner would loose less time. Transactions that are not
in conflict (read/write conflicts) with other transactions in
the same block can be verified in parallel. The remaining
conflicting transactions must still be verified in sequence.
To implement parallel verification in a real system, the
Ethereum Virtual Machine needs to support it, using multi-
threading. Miners then attach an execution schedule to their
proposed blocks. The schedule details which transactions can
be processed in parallel (no read/write conflicts) and which
must be executed in sequence. We assume miners provide a
correct schedule and are well motivated to include the schedule
in their blocks.
To obtain a closed-form expression for the received reward,
two parameters are added to the parameters of the Ethereum
base model (Section III-B), namely the conflict rate and the
number of processors. Note that we still assume that all blocks
are valid, as in the base model. The conflict rate c is the
percentage of conflicting transactions in a block. For example,
c= 0.4 means that 40% of the block’s transactions are in
conflict with other transactions in the same block. We note
that according to [4], the number of conflicting transactions in
real blockchains is not very high since there are thousands of
different contracts. The number of concurrent processors p is
the number of machines the miner has available in parallel.
With p processors and c conflict rate, the slow down of
performing the parallel verification process (δ) is:
δ = (1− αV ) ∗ T v ∗ (c+ 1− c
p
) (4)
The fraction of blocks and rewards for verifying and non-
verifying miners is based on the same equations as in Section
III-B.
Apply the parallel verification to the previous example, with
c = 0.4 and p = 4. Then, the slow down of performing the
parallel verification as δ = 0.1749. The fraction of blocks
generated by the nine verifying miners is reduced from 0.9 to
0.888. Thus, the non-verifying miner would gain 0.012 more
blocks and rewards (≈ 12% more than its invested α). In other
words, the fraction of blocks generated by the non-verifying
miner increases from 0.1 to 0.112.
B. Mitigation 2: Intentional Invalid Blocks
In this section, we introduce a solution whereby Ethereum
could allocate a special node for intentionally generating
invalid blocks as a way to punish non-verifying miners. This
special node is assigned a particular hash power (e.g., α =
0.04) of the total network hash power. The hash power of
the special node simply represents the fraction of the invalid
blocks to be purposely generated in the network. We assume
this node to verify all blocks generated by other miners, and
thus, it always works on the valid branch of the blockchain.
The rationale behind this approach is that miners benefit from
not verifying because all (or almost all) blocks are valid
anyway. However, if incoming blocks could be invalid, the
non-verifying miner could end up working on new blocks
on top of the invalid ones. Consequently, the non-verifying
miner would lose the rewards for those new blocks since other
verifying miners will reject the blocks because they were built
on top of invalid ones. Since this scenario includes non-valid
blocks, we have no closed-form insights for this scenario.
However, we will extensively study the result of injecting
invalid blocks in the simulation results in Section VII.
V. DATA COLLECTION AND DISTRIBUTION FITTING
To obtain insights into the Verifier’s Dilemma in Ethereum,
we will parameterize the simulation with data collected from
the Ethereum blockchain as well as data obtained from an
experimental measurement system to measure the CPU time
required for smart contract transactions. We managed to collect
data and measure CPU time for about 324,000 contract-related
transactions. To be of use to the simulation in Section VI, we
fit probability distributions to the transaction attributes (Gas
Limit, Used Gas, Gas Price, and CPU time).
A. Design of Data Collection Approach
As we mentioned in Section II-A, smart contracts are both
created and executed through a transaction. In this section, we
propose an automated data collection approach to collect the
details (e.g., Gas Limit, Used Gas, Gas Price, and input data)
of contract transactions (both contract-creation and contract-
execution). For a contract-execution transaction, our approach
also collects the details of the transaction that created the
Fig. 1. CPU Time (in second) versus Used Gas (in million) for (a) Contract-
execution and (b) Contract-creation.
contract. Our approach makes use of the APIs provided by
Etherscan1 to retrieve the details of transactions, and it is
implemented as a Python script.
To get the CPU time data for contract-related transac-
tions, we propose a system that is capable of measuring
the CPU usage for smart contracts transactions by isolating
the execution of the transactions from other computation and
overhead (e.g., transaction validation and the PoW overhead).
Our measurement system consists of two phases, namely,
preparation and execution. During the preparation phase, we
configure the blockchain and set up the Ethereum’s global
state. In addition, we initialize a set of Ethereum accounts to
submit and execute transactions. During the execution phase,
we construct, send, and execute transactions. We construct a
transaction by setting its details or fields using the details for
transactions we collected from Ethereum. Then, we use the
accounts we initialised in the preparation phase to submit and
execute the constructed transaction. The execution of a con-
tract transaction requires three tasks, which are checking the
validity of the transaction, running the data of the transaction
on the EVM and finally updating the state upon successful
execution. We place a timer before and after the execution of
the transaction on the EVM. Once the transaction has been
successfully executed, we record its Used Gas and the time it
takes to run on the EVM.
We managed to collect the details (including measuring
the CPU time) of about 324,000 transactions (3,915 contract-
creation and 320,109 contract-execution transactions). We
selected those transactions randomly. Figure 1 shows the Used
Gas in million versus the CPU Time in second for (a) contract-
execution and (b) contract-creation transactions. From Figure
1, it is clear that the CPU usage is not proportional or linear
with the amount of Used Gas, especially for contract-execution
transactions.
The CPU time measured here is from a single machine using
the Python PyEthApp [11] client. The machine is a desktop
PC with a 3.40GHz Intel i7 CPU with 8GB RAM running on
Windows 10. Each transaction is executed 200 times, and the
1Etherscan is a block explorer platform for Ethereum that provides APIs
with various functions related to accounts, contracts, blocks, transactions, etc.
average time is then calculated. The 95% confidence interval
is not reported here, but it is within 2% of the average value.
B. Fitting Distribution to Data
To utilize the collected data in our simulation, we need to
fit distributions with respect to attributes such as Used Gas,
Gas Limit, Gas Price and CPU Time. To do this, we need
to understand if there is dependency across these attributes.
To understand the relationship between multiple variables or
attributes in a data set we applied two different correlation
methods, namely, Pearson [12] and Spearman [13].
The Pearson method assesses the linear relationship between
variables, while the Spearman method assesses the monotonic
relationship. In a linear relationship, the variables tend to
change together at a constant rate, while in a monotonic
relationship they tend to change together, but not necessarily
at the same rate. Based on the correlation analysis results, we
come to the following conclusions. (1) The CPU Time attribute
has a strong positive non-linear correlation with Used Gas. (2)
Gas Limit has a weak to a medium positive correlation with
Used Gas. The correlation might come from the fact that the
Gas Limit is always greater than or equal to the Used Gas.
(3) Gas Limit has a weak to a medium positive correlation
with the CPU Time. This correlation is slightly stronger for
the creation set compared to the execution set. (4) Gas Price
is independent of all other attributes, and, indeed, it does not
have any relationship with different attributes.
We apply our fitting approach to the creation and execution
sets separately. We fit a general probabilistic distribution to the
Gas Price and the Used Gas values. We eventually decided to
select Gaussian Mixture Models (GMMs) to fit the log of the
data since none of the simple structured distributions fits the
data particularly well. However, when considering the log of
the data its shape resembles a normal distribution or a mixture
of normal distributions.
For the Gas Limit, it is appropriate to fit a uniform distri-
bution, where the minimum value is the Used Gas and the
maximum value is the block limit. This is because the Gas
Limit is specified by the submitter of the transaction and it
can take any value up to the block limit. Thus, the Gas Limit
values will be drawn from a uniform distribution as follows:
Gas Limit ∼ Unif(Used Gas, block limit) (5)
The current block limit is about 8 ∗ 106 unit of gas. For the
CPU time, we fit a non-linear regression model (e.g., Random
Forest Regressor) to predict the CPU time value from the given
Used Gas value.
For the CPU Time, we decided to select Random Forest
Regression (RFR) [14] to train a model to be able to predict
the CPU time value, given the Used Gas value. The reasons for
selecting RFR is as follows. Firstly, it uses ensemble methods
where different models (as opposed to a single model) are
constructed in order to improve the accuracy of predictions.
In addition, it is known to be robust against over-fitting, even
when the number of decision trees increases [14]. Furthermore,
RFR does not require any knowledge or assumptions about the
distribution of the data [15].
Algorithm 1 The fitting and sampling procedure
1: procedure FIT A GMM TO LOG(Gas Price)
2: Determine K . Use AIC/BIC
3: Estimate
∑K
i=1
µi,
∑K
i=1
σ2i ,
∑K
i=1
φi . Use EM algorithm
4: P= GMM(K,
∑K
i=1
µi,
∑K
i=1
σ2i ,
∑K
i=1
φi).fit(log(Gas Price))
5: procedure FIT A GMM TO LOG(Used Gas)
6: Determine K . Use AIC/BIC
7: Estimate
∑K
i=1
µi,
∑K
i=1
σ2i ,
∑K
i=1
φi . Use EM algorithm
8: U= GMM(K,
∑K
i=1
µi,
∑K
i=1
σ2i ,
∑K
i=1
φi).fit(log(Used Gas))
9: procedure FIT A RFR TO(Used Gas,CPU Time)
10: Determine and optimise d, s . Use Grid Search CV
11: T= RFR(d, s).fit(Used Gas,CPU Time)
12: procedure SAMPLE ATTRIBUTES(SP , SU , SL, ST )
13: SP = exp(P.sample(n)) . Sample Gas Price
14: SU = exp(U.sample(n)) . Sample Used Gas
15: SL = Unif(low = su, high = 8 ∗ 106, size = n) . Sample Gas
Limit
16: ST = T.predict(SU ) . Sample CPU Time
The procedure for fitting distributions to the attributes as
well as sampling from such distributions is summarized in
Algorithm 1. To fit a GMM to the log Used Gas and to the
log Gas Price (line 1-8), we have to estimate the number of
Gaussian components K, the mean µi, the variance term σ2i
and the weight φi of each component. To determine K, we
use Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) [16] and Bayesian
Information Criterion (BIC) [17]. We tested K values ranging
from 1 to 100 and then selected the best K according to these
criteria. To determine the parameters for each component, we
use the Expectation-Maximisation (EM) algorithm [18]. After
estimating these parameters, we fit the GMM to the data.
To fit a RFR model to learn and predict the CPU Time from
a given Used Gas value (line 9-11), we have to determine
and optimise the number of trees d and the number of splits
in each tree s. To optimise d and s, we use a grid search
technique with K-folds cross-validation (CV), where K = 10
as suggested by [19]. We searched a number of values ranging
from 10 to 500 and a number of values ranging from 1 to 300
to optimise d and s, respectively. Then, we selected the best-
tuned values for these parameters to fit the RFR model. After
fitting the distributions to the attributes, we sample values for
the transactions’ attributes from the fitted distributions (line
12-16).
We implemented the algorithmic procedure in Python.
We used the machine learning library Scikit-learn and
utilised different packages from this library, namely Gaussian-
Mixture, RandomForestRegressor, GridSearchCV, and KFold.
The GaussianMixture package contains the EM algorithm
and the AIC/BIC criteria. We implemented a Python class
to fit distributions to the attributes in the creation and the
execution sets, respectively. In addition, we implemented a
sampling method that takes as input the number of data points
(transactions) to be simulated and returns the values of the
simulated attributes as a tuple.
The Appendix contains results of the fitting approach. In
the main body of the paper we concentrate on aspects specific
to the Verifier’s Dilemma.
VI. SIMULATOR AND VALIDATION OF CLOSED-FORM
EXPRESSIONS
At the core of our model-based approach to analysing
the Verifier’s Dilemma is the publicly available BlockSim
simulator, which we extended to be able to study the Verifier’s
Dilemma. In this Section we report in Section VI-A on how
we extended BlockSim and in Section VI-B on the use of
the simulator to validate the closed-form solutions derived in
Section III and IV.
A. BlockSim Simulator Extension
BlockSim [3], [20] is a generic and extensible discrete-event
simulation framework that can be used to analyse a variety of
non-functional properties of various blockchain architectures.
The BlockSim simulator has been validated against data from
real blockchain implementations as well as against measure-
ment studies from the literature. The source code of the
simulator is freely available. BlockSim crosses three different
layers (consensus, incentives, and network layers) and is
based on core functional abstractions that are common across
blockchains, such as blocks, transactions, fork resolution, and
incentive distribution. The used implementation of BlockSim
includes the PoW-based consensus as used in both Bitcoin
and Ethereum, and can be further extended and changed as
required.
To support the analysis of both the Ethereum base model
and the solutions of parallel verification and intentional pro-
duction of invalid blocks, we introduced the following modi-
fications:
The attributes of transactions: We extended the Transac-
tion class to include several attributes required by the model,
which are Gas Limit, Used Gas, Gas Price, and CPU Time.
Thus, each transaction created in our simulations has these
attributes.
The distribution fitting class (DistFit): We defined a
new class named DistFit to fit probability distributions to the
transaction attributes. This follows the procedure introduced in
Section V-B). We execute the distribution fitting once. During
the simulation, when creating new transactions, we sample
random values for these attributes from the fitted distributions.
The number of processors (p): This dictates the number of
processors a miner could use to verify transactions in parallel.
To add this feature to the simulator, we extended the Node
class by adding a new attribute named processors.
The rate of conflicting transactions (c): This dictates the
fraction of transactions that depend on other transactions in the
system. To add this feature to the simulator, we introduced a
new input parameter called conflict rate. We also extended
the Transaction class by adding a new attribute named depen-
dency for transactions, to distinguish between conflicting and
non-conflicting transactions. Each transaction created will be
assigned to a random value (True or False) for the dependency
attribute based on the conflict rate parameter.
Parallel verification of transactions: To add this feature to
the simulator, we modified the execution of the block receiving
event as follows. Upon receiving a new block, we distribute
non-conflicting transactions between the different processors,
after which the conflicting ones will be executed sequentially
on a single processor. Hence, we count the time required
to verify transactions in parallel by checking the CPU time
attribute for transactions. Prior to starting the verification, the
time for all processors is set to 0 (all processors are idle).
During the verification process, we keep recording the time
when each processor finishes the transaction at hand and pass
a new transaction to start afterward.
The intentional production of invalid blocks: To add this
feature to the simulator, we first extended the Block class by
adding a new attribute named validity for blocks, to distinguish
between valid and invalid blocks. Each block created will be
assigned to a value (True or False) for the validity attribute.
Then, we set one of the miners to be the network node that
always generates invalid blocks. The hash power of this node
can be changed to reflect the fraction of invalid blocks to be
generated in the network.
B. Validation of Closed-Form Expressions
To validate the closed-form solutions from Sections III-B
and IV-A, we need first to estimate the average time it takes
to verify a block’s transactions. The verification time depends
on which transactions are included in the block. In particular,
different transactions take different time as well as blocks
may have very different number of transactions depending
on the gas used by these transactions. Hence, we utilised the
simulator to simulate different configurations of block limits
(the limit is expressed in million (M) units of gas). For each
configuration, we simulated 10000 blocks and the statistical
results related to the block’s verification time are given in
Table I. The table gives the minimum (min), the maximum
(max), the mean, the median, and the standard deviation (SD)
for the block’s verification time, all in seconds.
TABLE I
THE STATISTICAL RESULTS FOR THE BLOCK’S VERIFICATION TIME (T V )
IN SECONDS FOR DIFFERENT BLOCK LIMITS.
Block’s verification time (T v)
block limit min max mean median SD
8M 0.03 0.35 0.23 0.24 0.04
16M 0.16 0.65 0.46 0.47 0.06
32M 0.51 1.09 0.87 0.87 0.06
64M 1.06 2.08 1.56 1.56 0.19
128M 2.5 3.75 3.18 3.19 0.19
To validate the closed-form expressions (Equations (1) to
(4)) for both the Ethereum base model and the parallel
verification solution, we compare the simulation results with
that of the equations. We configured the simulator as follows.
We set the block interval time to be 12.42 seconds, which
is the minimum observed interval between blocks according
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Fig. 2. Results from the closed-form expressions and the simulation in the
fraction of fee received by a non-verifying miner who has 10% of hashing
power, for (a) the Ethereum base model and (b) the parallel verification
solution.
to Etherscan2. The attributes (Gas Limit, Used Gas, Gas
Price, and CPU Time) for transactions are generated from
distributions, as discussed in SectionV-B. We set the number
of miners to 10, where each miner controls 10% of the
total network hash power. Nine miners follow the protocol
honestly by executing the verification process upon receiving
a newly generated block, apart from one miner who skips the
verification process. For the parallel verification, we set the
number of processors to 4 and the conflict rate of transactions
to 0.4. Then, we record the fraction of fee each miner receives
at the end of the simulation.
We run simulation experiments with different configurations
of block limits (ranging from 8M to 128M). For each con-
figuration, we simulated the equivalent of 3 days of running
time of the Ethereum network and repeated this to have
100 independent runs. Figure 2 shows the validation of both
the Ethereum base model and the parallel verification by
presenting the results from the closed-form solutions as well
as from the simulation. The vertical axes shows the percentage
of the received fee the non-verifying miner receives. One sees
from Figure 2 that the non-verifying miner always wins, since
in this scenario all blocks are valid, so the miner is never
penalized for non verifying. The gain can be a full percentage
point or more as the block limit increases. Various additional
results will be discussed in Section VII.
We note that the simulation results slightly differ from that
of the closed-form for the larger block limits. The closed-form
expressions slightly overestimate the gain miners get from
not validating blocks, but the differences are small. Several
elements are modeled in more detail in the simulation than
in the closed-form expressions, and these may contribute to
randomness that causes a difference between closed-form and
simulation. We believe that it is fair to conclude from Figure
2 that the closed-form expressions are close to the simulation
results.
2https://etherscan.io/chart/blocktime
VII. RESULTS
In this section, we present the main findings from our
analysis of the Verifier’s Dilemma, under the Ethereum base
model as well as under the proposed mitigations of parallel
verification and intentional production of invalid blocks. Our
main metric of interest is the fee gained or lost by non-
verifying miners in various scenarios.
We summarize the main findings that follow from our
discussion upfront:
• The smaller the hash power a miner controls, the more
advantage the miner would gain from skipping the veri-
fication process.
• In today’s Ethereum, miners gain relatively little from
skipping the verification (less than 2% of the invested
hash power). This is because the block limit in Ethereum
is currently small.
• In the future, the Ethereum block limit is expected
to increase. In that case, skipping verification becomes
considerably more lucrative. This is under the assumption
that most miners honestly verify and invalid transactions
are rare.
• Parallel verification reduces the benefits miners would get
from not verifying blocks. This is especially true if the
conflict rate is small and the number of parallel processors
is large.
• The mitigation approach to purposely introducing invalid
blocks in the network can significantly reduce the benefits
of non-verifying miners. This is especially true if the rate
of invalid blocks is large or the block limit is small. In
this case, miners may be better off to verify.
A. Ethereum Base Model
Figure 3 shows the percentage of fee increase a non-
verifying miner would gain, for different block limits and
different block interval times. The four curves in each of the
two plots of Figure 3 indicate different fractions of the total
hash power owned by the non-verifying miner. In Figure 3(a),
we consider a block interval time of 12.42 seconds. In Figure
3(b), we consider a block limit of 8M, which is the block limit
currently used in Ethereum.
From Figure 3 we conclude that for the current implemen-
tation of Ethereum (block limit = 8M and block interval time
is between 12 and 15 seconds), the percentage fee increase
is small (less than 2% of the invested hash power). Yet, this
percentage increases significantly with the block limit or the
reduction of the block interval time. For instance, a non-
verifying miner with α = 0.05 would increase its gain from
1.7% for small blocks to a remarkable 22% when the block
limit is pushed from 8M to 128M. In addition, we can see
that the smaller the hash power a miner controls the larger
the increase the miner gets when not verifying blocks. For
example, a miner with α = 0.05 can increase its fraction of fee
to 24% when the block limit is 128M, while it only increases
its fraction to about 14% if α = 0.40. This is because a miner
has to verify all the blocks that were mined by others, which
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Fig. 3. The percentage of fee increase for a non-verifying miner with the
Ethereum base model: (a) different block limits and (b) different block interval
time.
amounts to (1 − α) of the network blocks, as we discussed
in Section III-B. In other words, in Ethereum, small miners
spend more time on verification than large miners because they
receive more new blocks from other miners. Therefore, small
miners have more to gain from stopping with verifying.
B. Parallel Verification
Parallel verification of transactions is a solution that we
proposed in Section IV-A to minimize the advantage non-
verifying miners would gain by reducing the overall time
required for the verification process. Figure 4 shows the
percentage of fee increase that a non-verifying miner would
gain, for different block limits, different block interval times,
different number of processors and different conflict rates
for transactions. As in Section VII-A, the different curves
represent different hash powers for the non-verifying miner.
From Figure 4 we see that although the percentage of fee
increase rises with the block limit or the reduction of the block
interval time, the advantage is reduced almost to half that of
the Ethereum base model (see Figure 3). This is for modest
parallelization, with only 4 processors and a conflict rate of
0.4. In addition, from (c) and (d) we see that the advantage
decreases further with the increase of the number of processors
or with a small rate of conflicting transactions. For instance,
assume an 8M block limit and 0.4 conflict rate. Then the
increase a non-verifying miner with α= 0.10 would get goes
down from about 1.2% to 0.7%, when increasing the number
of processors from 2 to 16. To summarize, the advantage a
miner would gain by skipping the verification is minimized
when shifting from the Ethereum base model to the parallel
verification solution. The degree of reduction depends on the
conflict rate and the number of concurrent processors.
C. Production of Invalid Blocks
The idea behind intentionally introducing invalid blocks
(Section IV-B) is to punish non-verifying miners. To assess
if this approach can be useful, we modify the BlockSim
simulation classes to account for the possibility of having
invalid blocks. We run simulation experiments with different
configurations of block limits and different rates of invalid
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blocks. The rate of invalid blocks refers to the hash power
of the special node that only generates invalid blocks. For
each configuration, we simulated 1 day of the Ethereum
network and reported the average results obtained from 100
independent runs. For these experiments, we considered a
block interval time of 12.42 seconds.
Figure 5 shows the percentage of fee increase that a non-
verifying miner would gain given some fraction of invalid
blocks in the network, for different block limits and different
rates of invalid blocks. The different curves represent different
hash powers for the non-verifying miner. For Figure 5(a), we
consider a block interval time of 12.42 seconds and an invalid
blocks rate of 0.04. For Figure 5(b), we consider a block
interval time of 12.42 seconds and a block limit of 8M.
From Figure 5 we see that the fee increase for non-verifying
miners is significantly reduced when inserting invalid blocks
in the network. For instance, the fee increase a non-verifying
miner with α= 0.10 would get decreases from about 22% to
13.6%, when the rate of invalid blocks is 0.04 and the block
limit is 128M.
Even more interesting, non-verifying miners might get less
reward than one would expect based on their hash power. That
is, we establish a situation in which verifying is preferred over
not verifying. This is especially pronounced when the block
limit is small or when the rate of invalid blocks is large. For
example, a non-verifying miner with α= 0.10 would lose about
5% fee when the block limit is 8M and the rate of invalid
blocks is 0.04. That means that conducting the verification
process in that case is more profitable than skipping it.
We also note that miners with large hash powers (e.g.,
α ≥ 0.20) are affected more when not verifying blocks,
compared to miners with small hash powers. For example,
a non-verifying miner with α = 0.05 can lose about 3% of its
expected fraction of fee when the block limit is 8M and the
rate of invalid blocks is 0.04, while it would lose about 24%
of its expected fraction of fee if α = 0.40.
To summarize, purposely introducing invalid blocks into
the blockchain could discourage miners from not verifying
received blocks. The degree of deterrence depends on the rate
of invalid blocks in addition to other blockchain configurations
such as block limit.
VIII. DISCUSSION
In Section VII, we showed the advantage a non-verifying
miner may get from not verifying blocks in the Ethereum
base model. In addition, we showed how parallel verification
and intentional production of invalid blocks could mitigate
against such behaviour, potentially even making skipping the
verification worse than verifying itself. In this section, we
discuss the possible threats to the validity of our evaluation.
Execution time of transactions: The CPU time to verify
each transaction is based on the measurements obtained from
a particular machine. In reality, miners might use different and
possibly much more powerful machines and the specifications
of machines are expected to improve in the future. The key
indicator for the relative importance of the verification effort
is how it compares to the effort spent on mining new blocks,
which is determined predominantly by the PoW difficulty.
However, even with more powerful machines and/or increased
PoW difficulty, the Verifier’s Dilemma will become a problem
at some point if the block limit reaches a particular threshold
or if more complex contracts are permitted.
Different types of transactions: We studied the Verifier’s
Dilemma assuming that all transactions in the network are
contract-related. However, there are many financial transac-
tions in Ethereum and since these can be verified very quickly
the advantage of not verifying blocks may not be as large as in
Section VII. In that sense, our analysis should be considered
a worst case analysis. Either way, the main insights derived
from our analysis remain valid, even if exact values and results
may be different.
Full blocks of transactions: We also assumed that all
blocks are filled up with transactions, but in reality it is
possible to have non-full or even empty blocks. In that case
the advantage of not verifying blocks will also be less than in
Section VII. However, by design the block reward is decreas-
ing and is expected to be removed eventually [21]. When there
is no block rewards, miners will be much more encouraged
to fill up their blocks with transactions to maximise their
rewards. Irrespective, our analysis can be considered a worst
case analysis and the main insights derived from our analysis
remain valid, even if exact values and results may be different.
Parallel verification of transactions: Parallel verification
discourages skipping verification. However, the implementa-
tion of parallel verification on a real blockchain system is an
open research problem [22], [23]. Complications arise because,
first, a miner needs to attach a table to its block in order for
the verifier to know which transactions can be run on parallel.
Producing the table is not simple since the miner has to figure
out conflicting and non-conflicting transactions [4]. A second
issue is that one needs to trust the miners to produce the correct
table. And, finally, the EVM should be updated to support
multi-threading.
Intentional insertion of invalid blocks: This approach
does not only make skipping the verification a less benefi-
cial strategy, it often makes verifying the prefered strategy.
Although this solution can be easily adopted in Ethereum,
its introduction would likely face some challenges. Producing
invalid blocks in the network decreases the performance of the
system and it will impose an extra task for honestly verifying
miners as they are expected to verify those invalid blocks and
then reject them. So, in practice, one would expect Ethereum
to be very hesitant adding such overhead to the system.
Different consensus algorithms: We studied the Verifier’s
Dilemma for the PoW protocol. However, Ethereum and other
blockchains are planning to move to more efficient protocols
such as Proof of Stake (PoS) [24], [25]. Since alternatives
to PoW can be expected to be computationally much more
efficient than PoW, one would expect that the computation as-
sociated with verification becomes relatively more important.
This would increase the pressure on miners to consider not to
verify blocks. Clearly, studying the impact of the verification
process under different consensus protocols is of interest.
Within PoS, for instance, miners might be given a specific time
window to finish and propose a block. If the miner spends a
long time doing the verification process, it might not be able
to finish the block on time, losing the rewards [26].
IX. RELATED WORK
The Verifier’s Dilemma was first identified by Luu et al.
[1], who showed that rational miners would be motivated
to skip the verification process to gain an advantage in the
race to mine the next blocks. Related to this idea is the
mining strategy proposed in [26], whereby a malicious miner
purposely design smart contracts that are computationally
expensive to verify, to slow down other miners. In response,
[1], [26] showed the profitability of skipping the verification
process in scenarios in which computationally intensive smart
contracts were introduced.
This work left unanswered several questions. In particular,
it was not known if the above attack was practical, nor was it
clear how different miners with different hash powers might
benefit from not verifying blocks. In this paper, we address
these limitations by evaluating the implications of the Verifer’s
Dilemma using real Ethereum smart contracts transactions.
In addition, we assess both current and future settings of
Ethereum, taking into consideration the hash power of miners.
Several solutions in the literature have been proposed to
make the verification of complex transactions a more efficient
task in order to avoid the Verifier’s Dilemma. In [1], the
authors proposed a solution in which complex transactions
are divided into various smaller transactions that can be
incorporated in various blocks. In [4], [27], [28], the authors
proposed solutions for executing and verifying smart contracts
in parallel. They showed that such solutions could speed
up the execution/verification time of contracts compared to
that of a sequential solution. In addition, several off-chain
solutions (e.g., TrueBit [2], YODA [29] and Arbitrum [30])
for efficient computation of computationally expensive smart
contracts have been proposed as an alternative to the protocol
used in Ethereum. In these solutions, only a small set of nodes,
instead of all nodes, has to perform the verification of complex
contracts. Those nodes will be rewarded if they perform the
verification correctly, or otherwise, a penalty will be imposed.
In [4], [27], [28], however, the authors did not investigate
the parallel verification of smart contracts as a mitigation
solution to the Verifier’s Dilemma. In this paper, we propose
and evaluate the parallel verification as a solution to reduce
the advantage miners would get from not verifying. Besides,
we propose and evaluate the intentional production of invalid
blocks as a new solution to punish non-verifying miners. We
inspired the idea of injecting invalid blocks in the network
from [2].
X. CONCLUSION
This paper provides an extensive analysis of the Verifier’s
Dilemma, following a data-driven, model-based approach that
combines closed-form expressions with discrete-event simula-
tion and utilizes machine learning techniques to parameterize
and configure probability distributions used by the simulator.
This is the first extensive analysis of the Verifier’s Dilemma
we are aware of. The insights we gained in this paper can be
of assistance in anticipating the implications of the Verifier’s
Dilemma under future developments, e.g., when the block limit
increases in Ethereums, or when Proof of Work is replaced. Of
particular importance for the fairness of blockchain systems is
that our analysis shows that small miners are more impacted
by the verification demands, and will be more tempted not
to verify. Our results also indicate that, counter-intuitively,
problems associated with the Verifier’s Dilemma exacerbate if
there are less invalid transactions. This leads to the insight that
future blockchain systems may operate better if designers or
operators assure that some transactions are invalid. We suggest
that similar analysis as reported in this paper should be carried
out for future system designs and operational developments,
to anticipate the consequences of the Verifier’s Dilemma.
XI. APPENDIX
A. Evaluation of the Fitting Algorithm
To fit distributions to the transactions’ attributes (see Section
V-B), we use two different models, namely, GMMs and RFR.
In this section, we evaluate the performance of these models
using two approaches. The first one is a visual evaluation by
comparing the kernel density estimation (KDE) of the original
data with that of the sampled data generated from the models.
The second approach is to evaluate the performance of the
models using some suitable metrics such as r2, where possible.
1) RFR Evaluation: To assess the accuracy of the RFR
models, we utilised different score metrics such as mean
absolute error (MAE), root mean squared error (RMSE),
and the coefficient of determination (R2). We measured the
accuracy of an RFR model for seen and unseen data to
ensure the generality of the model and the robustness of the
model against over-fitting. We measured the performance of
the model by relying on K-folds cross-validation, where K =
10, as suggested by [19]. We refer to the performance of the
model with seen and unseen data as the training results and
the testing results, respectively.
TABLE II
THE PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF THE RFR REGRESSION MODELS FOR
BOTH CREATION AND EXECUTION SETS.
Training Results Testing Results
MAE RMSE R2 MAE RMSE R2
Creation Set 34.29 355.12 0.96 78.47 900.20 0.82
Execution Set 25.63 162.74 0.99 29.39 426.59 0.93
Table II shows different score metrics (MAE, RMSE, and
R2) to measure the performance of the RFR regression models
used to predict the CPU Time values for both the creation and
execution sets. From Table II, we can see that RFR models
perform well on both seen and unseen data for both creation
and execution sets. This indicates the generality of the RFR
models as well as the avoidance of over-fitting.
In addition to the evaluation metrics, we compared the KDE
of the original CPU Time data with that of the sampled one.
This is to assess if the samples generated from the RFR models
are similar to the original data. From Figure 6, it is clear that
the KDE for the sampled data looks very similar to that of the
original one.
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Fig. 6. KDE for original and sampled CPU time for both execution set (left)
and creation set (right).
2) GMMs Evaluation: It is not possible to validate 1D
GMM models using performance metrics as we did with the
RFR model. However, we compared the KDE for the original
Used Gas data with that of the sampled one. This is to assess
whether the samples generated from the GMMs models are
similar to the original data. From Figure 7-8, it is clear that
the KDE for the sampled data looks very similar to that of the
original one for both Used Gas and Gas Price.
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Fig. 8. KDE for original and sampled Gas Price for both execution set (left)
and creation set (right).
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